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ABSTRACT 
In  this  paper,  we  describe  the  prevention-focused  and  adaptive 
middleware  mechanisms  implemented  as  part  of  the  Advanced 
Adaptive Applications (A3) Environment that we are developing 
as  a  near-application  and  application-focused  cyber-defense 
technology  under  the  DARPA  Clean-slate  design  of  Resilient, 
Adaptive, Secure Hosts (CRASH) program.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:  
Security  and  Protection—Authentication,  Invasive  software, 
Unauthorized access; 
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: General—Protection mechanisms 
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Execution  Environment,  Middleware,  Preventive  Adaptation, 
Innate Immunity, Survivable Applications. 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
The current way of running applications on host platforms often 
impedes cyber-defense. Multiple applications share the physical 
host and the OS.  Isolation techniques like SELinux [1] exist, but 
because of implicit sharing of various host resources, the security 
policies  frequently  are  not  tight  enough  and  as  a  result,  a 
compromise in one of the applications often leads to disruption or 
corruption  in  the  operation  of  other  collocated  applications. 
Stronger  isolation  technologies  such  as  separation  kernels  [2] 
although  available,  are  primarily  used  to  enforce  separation 
between multiple levels of security, and not among applications 
within  individual  security  domains.  In  addition,  application’s 
interactions  with  the  environment  through  the  network,  storage 
system or the user interface (UI) also take place in shared spaces. 
This makes it difficult to tightly monitor application behavior and 
enforce application specific controls, and resulted in various rings 
of  perimeter  security—at  the  network  boundary  or  at  the  host 
boundary—that  monitor  and  control  the  aggregate  of  multiple 
protectorate  constituents.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  existing 
perimeter  security  techniques  such  as  firewalls,  OS  or  process 
level  security  policies,  anti-virus  and  intrusion  detection  and 
prevention systems are signature-oriented making them ineffective 
against novel attacks.   
As recent reports [3] indicate, adversaries are still succeeding in 
getting  through  the  perimeter  defenses.  In  most cases, it is the 
applications that run on the hosts and the data these applications 
manage  that  are  the  target  of  these  attacks.  We  argue  that  no 
matter how secured the perimeter or the OS is, applications with 
complex logic, structure and interactions will still have flaws. And 
such flaws will be discovered and exploited by the adversary who 
will  often  gain  access  and  privilege  in  the  network  and  host 
environment via social engineering and compromising collocated 
enclaves,  hosts  and  applications  with  weaker  security.  Security 
measures near or at the application that go beyond detection and 
prevention, and aim to tolerate the impact caused by unknown and 
unforeseen attacks are therefore urgently needed.   
In this paper we introduce the Advanced Adaptive Applications 
(A3)  Environment,  an  innovative  middleware  designed  for 
defending individual applications against novel attacks. The A3 
environment  is  a  middleware  because it mediates the protected 
application’s  execution  and  interaction  with  the  physical  host 
resources such as the disk, network and UI devices. Adaptation is 
a major underlying theme of A3’s defenses, which in the context 
of survivability, ranges from graceful degradation to recovery, and 
to  changing  the  system  so  that  successful  past  attacks  do  not 
succeed  anymore.  A3  carries  forward  our  prior  successes  in 
adaptive  defense  and  survivability  research  [4,5,6,7]  which 
assumes that no defense is absolute, attacks will happen and often 
succeed; and argues that although adaptation is key to survival, 
successful  defense  must  include  prevention  focused  defenses  
observation  mechanisms  designed  to  pick  up  undesirable 
conditions  as  well.  This  paper  will  primarily  focus  on  the 
foundational aspects of A3, and will offer a deep dive into the 
prevention  focused  defensive  capability.  Prevention-focused 
defense is one of the three main defensive capabilities of A3, the 
other  two  being  recovery  techniques  based  on  advanced  state 
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application’s defense based on past successes and failures.   
The main contributions of this paper are: 1) a special breed of 
execution-containing  security-focused  adaptive  middleware  that 
mediates  the  protected  application’s  interactions  with  the 
environment, b) a framework to structure and impose prevention 
focused adaptive control on an application’s interaction with the 
environment, c) a foundation for novel recovery and replay based 
improvement, and d) initial results establishing the feasibility of 
effective  and  efficient  implementation  of  innovative,  near-
application and application-centric defenses.  
A3 technology is being developed as part of the DARPA CRASH 
program, which pursues innovative R&D into the design of new 
computer  systems  that  are  highly  resistant  to  cyber-attack,  can 
adapt  after  a  successful  attack  to  continue  rendering  useful 
services,  learn  from  previous attacks how to guard against and 
cope with future attacks, and can repair themselves after attacks 
have  succeeded.  Complementing  the  application-level  and 
application-focused  approach  taken  by  A3,  a  number  of  other 
efforts  in  the  CRASH  program  are  developing    techniques  for 
security enhanced processor architectures (e.g., tagged instruction 
and execution), OS based security techniques (e.g., information 
flow  control),  and  programming  language  and  compiler 
technologies (e.g., randomizing compiler to produce variants with 
different  vulnerability  profiles,  security  focused  invariants  and 
assertions  that  can  be  embedded  in  the  application  during 
development and enforced at runtime). 
2.  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The  key  idea  underpinning  the  A3  environment  is  to  isolate 
individual  applications  into  dedicated  containers  such  that  (i) 
application-specific  defensive  adaptations  do  not  interfere  with 
the operation of other applications and (ii) all interactions of the 
protected applications can be subject to mandatory mediation. We 
argue that if the application executable is pure (i.e., it may contain 
vulnerability, but is not corrupted with attack code) at inception, 
the only way it can be compromised is through its interactions 
with  the  environment  i.e.,  via  disk  storage,  network  and  user 
interfaces. Unfortunately, in a modern general purpose computing 
platform,  the  interface  between  an  application  and  the 
environment has gotten out of control with touch points at many 
known  and  unknown  surfaces.  Isolation  of  an  application  in  a 
container enables us to organize the applications interactions into 
storage, network and UI channels, which in turn enables us to put 
up  crumple  zones  that  subject  these  channels  to  mandatory 
mediation and act as buffers that absorb the initial blow of attacks 
(and potentially crumple), preventing the attack from reaching the 
protected application.  
A3 prevention-focused defenses are concentrated in the Crumple 
Zones (CZs). The CZs essentially impose a space-time dilation 
upon the application’s interaction: the interactions are intercepted, 
and can be watched, analyzed, processed and transformed in the 
defense’s timeframe, changing the equation for the attacker—the 
attacker  no  longer  has  the  advantage  of  hiding  in  a  general 
purpose host running various applications and services.  Instead, 
the  A3  container  is  dedicated to the single application and the 
attacker has to play by the rules of the protected application. 
A3  recovery-focused  defenses  leverage  the  isolation  of  the 
protected applications into dedicated containers and stands on the 
hypothesis that not all parts of the application’s state is equally 
important.  In  particular,  some  state  information  is  absolutely 
crucial and needs to be retained and the rest can be discarded, or 
recreated from other saved information. This differential treatment 
of  state  information  needed  for  recovering  a  crashed  or 
compromised application is at the core of A3’s Advanced State 
Management (ASM) that enables different flavors micro-reboots 
with  different  timeliness  and  consistency  profiles  on  top  of 
standard reboot and rollback based recovery options.  
For  adaptive  immunity,  i.e.,  the  ability  to  improve  the  defense 
over  time, A3 relies on  Replay with Modification  (RwM) — a 
capability that enables us to roll back the protected application to 
a past state, modify the protected application (e.g., a new variant) 
or  its  security  configuration  (e.g.,  the  inspection  and 
transformation  based  rules  in  the  crumple  zones),  and  perform 
replay-based  experiments.  If  the  recorded  events  contained  an 
attack,  i.e.,  triggered  a  vulnerability  that  compromised  the 
crumple  zone  or  the  protected  application,  the  experiments  are 
used  to  determine  an  alternate  configuration  of  the  protected 
application that does not suffer the same outcome. 
In the first year of the four year project, we have prototyped the 
basic  containerization  mechanism, and the storage and network 
crumple zones.  We are currently working on ASM and RwM. 
The  Crumple  Zones  and  container-isolated  applications  along 
with  the  ASM  and  RwM  capabilities  collectively  form  the 
envisioned  A3  environment—where  the  mediated  channels  and 
crumple  zones  prevent  the  protected  application  from  falling 
victim  of  attacks,  ASM  enables  faster  and  diversified  recovery 
when the application does succumb to failure and compromise, 
and RwM facilitates changes in the configuration that prevent the 
protected application from succumbing to the same attacks. 
2.1  Basic Containerized Isolation  
A3  uses  virtualization,  specifically  the  Xen  hypervisor  as  the 
basic  containerization  mechanism.  An  A3  container  running  a 
protected application will be a Dom U (guest) VM (see Figure 1), 
with its network, UI and storage channels logically connected to 
the  VM  that  runs the  device drivers that manage the hardware 
devices. In Xen, this could be the Dom0 VM, or one or more 
specialized  DomUs running the device drivers as advocated by 
security enhanced operating systems like Qubes [8] and L4 [9]. In 
our current prototype Dom0 is the designated Device Driver VM 
(DDVM).  In  the  future,  we  plan  to  put  the  device  drivers 
managing physical devices in their individual DDVMs separate 
from Dom0.  
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Figure 1: Guest VM as A3 Container Using  a  container  VM  to  encapsulate  the  protected application 
implies that the application has the impression of having an entire 
machine to itself including its own (virtual) disk. But disk storage 
is also used frequently by applications to share information—for 
instance, a file created by Word can subsequently be used by an 
email application when the user wants to send the file to someone 
by email.  Or, in order to read a file received by email, another 
application such as Word needs to be launched. If Word and email 
client applications run in their own dedicated container VMs, the 
file created by Word will remain in the container running word, 
and  the  file  received  by  the  email  client  will  remain  in  the 
container  running  the  email  client  application.  Note that  under 
A3,  each  application  runs  in  its  own  dedicated  container  and 
therefore, there needs to be a way to share files between the two 
containers.  More  specifically,  this  points  to  the  need  for 
synchronizing the virtual disks of different container VMs. This is 
a unique issue for the storage channel because of the semantic 
difference between virtualizing a storage device like a disk and a 
network  interface  or  an  IO  device:  whereas  a  virtual  network 
interface or IO device primarily acts as a multiplexer, the virtual 
disk  also  acts  a  (longer  term)  buffer.  The  A3  storage  channel 
therefore manages the mapping and synchronization of physical 
disk content that are shared across multiple applications into the 
respective  virtual  disks  by  using  a  commit  mechanism  which 
enforces the following policy: after N (configurable) number of 
updates, the storage channel commits the virtual disk and remaps 
and remounts the virtual disks (of other VMs) that share the same 
file  systems  of  the  physical  disk.  The  value  of  N  dictates  the 
synchronization delay. 
2.2  Mediated Channels and Crumple Zones 
Even  though  the  UI,  Network  and  Storage  channels  logically 
connect  the  A3  Container  and  the  DDVM  running  the  device 
drivers managing physical devices, the actual path is through the 
hypervisor. Therefore, extending the hypervisor is one possibility 
to  implement  the  channel  mediation  and  the  crumple  zones. 
However,  since  the  mediation  policies  are  highly  application-
specific,  this  approach  would  require  building/configuring  a 
custom  hypervisor  for  each  protected  application.  Furthermore 
crumple  zones  are  expected  to  fail  (i.e.,  crumple  under  attack) 
under attack, which in the case of hypervisor-extension approach, 
will threaten the integrity and liveness of the hypervisor. To avoid 
these  issues  we  designed  the  bulk  of  the  crumple  zones 
functionality  outside  the  hypervisor—specifically,  CZs  are 
implemented  as  interposed  VMs—the  mediation  policy  and 
controls  are  either  implemented  within  the  VM  containing  the 
protected application or in individual VMs that are part of the A3 
conglomerate representing and acting as the protected application.  
Interposing a crumple zone VM relies on Xen’s basic inter-VM 
communication technique of using a circular buffer in a shared 
memory page. The circular buffer connects the device driver in 
the  guest  VM  (known  as the  front-end  driver)  with  the  device 
driver in the DDVM that is responsible for managing the physical 
device  (known  as  the  back-end  driver).  For  storage  and  UI 
channels, only one circular buffer is used, whereas for network 
channels  a  pair  of  buffers is  used.  The  sharing of the memory 
pages  is  implemented  by  "grant  tables”  and  strictly  controlled 
share or transfer primitives. In this grant table based paradigm, 
sharing or transfer of data cannot be done without one side first 
making  a  hypervisor  call.  Our  VM-based  implementation  of 
containers  rely  on  the  trustworthiness  of  the  virtualization 
mechanism,  i.e.,  the  hypervisor  responsible  creating  VMs,  
assigning and managing VM identities is treated as part of the 
trusted  computing  base  (TCB),  the  grant  tables  and  shared 
memory circular buffer between the front-end device driver at the 
guest VM and the back-end device driver (that manages the actual 
hardware  devices)  at  the  DDVM  provides  a  fairly  strong  non-
bypassable  way  to  mediate  channel  interaction  outside  of  the 
hypervisor.  A  CZ  VM  can  be  inserted  in  front  of  the  Dom0 
DDVM  such  that  an  A3  container  VM  trying  to  use  the  real 
hardware devices (via the back-end drivers in the DDVM) must 
go through the CZ VM. Because the intercepted traffic is now 
available to a VM, we are not limited to looking at the contents of 
the circular memory buffers—our mediation policies can inspect, 
interpret and process the intercepted information at various levels 
of the system stack.  
Figure 2 shows the A3 conglomerate for protecting an illustrative 
application. Guest VM-1 is the container running the protected 
application  (APPVM  henceforth),  Guest  VM-2  is  the  storage 
CZVM  and  Guest  VM-3  is  the  network  CZVM.  The  storage 
CZVM and the corresponding split-pair device drivers (shown in 
grey) at DDVM form the storage channel, and the network CZVM 
and  the  corresponding  device  drivers  (shown  in  blue)  in  the 
DDVM form the network channel.  Note that although each of the 
CZVMs introduces an additional circular buffer indirection in the 
original paths connecting the APPVM and the DDVM, there is a 
slight difference. The storage CZVM connects with the APPVM 
presenting a backend driver and also with the DDVM presenting a 
front end driver. Whereas the network CZVM behaves much like 
the APPVM in the sense that it only has a front end driver, and 
connects only with the DDVM.  The network channel is designed 
in this way to take advantage of the Xen’s standard networking 
infrastructure (the Ethernet Bridge and supporting mechanisms at 
the  DDVM):  in  a  sense,  the  network  CZVM  acts  like  an 
intermediate hop between the APPVM and the DDVM. 
2.3  The I/E/T Prevention Framework  
To  facilitate  easy  conception,  formulation  and  enforcement  of 
application-specific  policy  and  control  that  can  prevent  entire 
classes of novel attacks we developed a framework to organize the 
mediation  policies  that  can  be  enforced  in  our  crumple  zones.  
Apart  from  thwarting  novel  attacks  for  which  a-priori  known 
signatures  do  not  exist,  the  other  key  design  goal  of  this 
framework  is  to  provide  a  structure  that  can  support  a  generic 
 
Figure 2: Insertion of Storage and Network CZ application by accommodating custom specializations. We argue 
the  constraints  and  consequent  reactive  adaptations  in  the 
following  three  categories  cover  a  wide  range  of  novel  attack 
avenues. 
  Inspect  (I):  Inspection  based  policy  and  control  include 
computing aggregate properties (e.g., rate, size, patterns) of 
interaction  and  subjecting  them  to  application-specific 
operating ranges. This category also includes filtering based 
on  known  signatures,  and  observing  the  side  effects  of 
execution-based policies that are described next. 
  Execute (E): This category supports execution or processing 
of  intercepted  interaction  to  determine  whether  the 
interaction would cause any known undesired effect on the 
protected application. If so, such interactions should not be 
released. On the lighter extreme, E policies may constitute 
straightforward  middleware  functions  such  as 
marshalling/demarshalling,  serializing/deserializing.  On  the 
heavier extreme, E policies engage a copy of the protected 
application executing and responding to the stimuli received 
on  the  mediated  channels  (with  appropriate  buffering  to 
eliminate  spurious  side  effects)  before  the  stimuli  are 
released  to  the  real  protected  application.    As  mentioned 
earlier, I policies may observe the execution of E policies, 
implementing the cyber security analog of a try before you 
buy or the 7 second profanity delay. 
  Transform  (T):  Analogous to  the  way  transformation  from 
time  domain  (amplitude  over  time)  to  frequency  domain  
reveals  and  enables  filtering  unwanted  noise  in  signal 
processing,  we  argue  attacks  that  exploit  data  format  or 
protocol flaws can be thwarted by data format or protocol 
conversion.  Such  transformations  need  to  be  semantics 
preserving  and  as  a  corollary  application  specific.  The 
common  input  validation  techniques  currently  in  use  to 
defend  against  SQL  injection,  CSRF  and  XSS  attacks 
transform parts of the incoming request—which are inbound 
interactions on the network channel for A3. In addition, a 
number of modern applications do not have a pre-conceived 
notion  of  data  format—for  example,  a  search  may  return 
anything  from  text,  PDF,  word,  spreadsheet,  audio  and 
video. Service-oriented applications (e.g., web services using 
WSDL) often are able to negotiate the nature and format of 
the  data  exchange  at  runtime.  In  these  cases,  application-
specific transformation from one protocol or data format to 
another is acceptable, and will either eliminate or disrupt the 
embedded  attack  code  or  data.  Even  with  traditional 
applications  where  the  protocol  and  data  format  is  not 
flexible, transformation from one format to another and back 
to the original will be useful for defense against embedded 
attacks.  This is because in most cases the attacks exploit the 
vendor-added features or lapses in the specification. If the 
transformations  strictly  impose  the  protocol/data  format 
specifications, malicious elements like embedded scripts can 
be eliminated or sufficiently disturbed to render then useless. 
Of  course,  this  scheme  may  impact  the  application’s 
operation if the application relies on vendor-added features. 
2.4  Current Prototype 
Figure 3 shows the A3 test environment where the APPVM runs 
an  illustrative  web  server  application  protected  by  the  two 
CZVMs  providing  application-specific  and  prevention-focused 
adaptive  defense  capability.    As shown, the web server  can be 
invoked  (HTTP  request)  by  a  browser  as  well  as  non-browser 
clients to manage documents. The server supports multiple users, 
each authenticates using a token, and can perform a list, upload, 
download  and  delete  operations  on  a  file  store.  The  server  is 
expected to maintain the file store within a specified directory—
and is not expected to write user submitted content to any other 
directory. The server is also expected to enforce ownership in the 
sense that a user cannot delete another user’s files, but they can 
openly share. However, the server implementation is inherently 
buggy,  and  it  is  possible  for  a  malicious  user  to  traverse  the 
directory  structure,  write  files  in  arbitrary  places,  rename  files, 
execute  cross  site  scripting,  upload  and  execute  arbitrary 
executables etc. This application does not use human interaction, 
so only the network and storage channels are relevant.  
The  storage  crumple  zone  that  we  used  for  this  application 
enforces the policy and control described below:  
 
 
Figure 3: Illustrative Web Server Application in A3 Policy item  Type  Control Action and notes 
Path traversal  C ; Inspect  Block requests that try  
Write outside  I; Inspect  Block requests that try 
Read outside  C; Inspect  Block requests that try 
Size limit  A; Inspect  Block requests with large data 
Rate limit 
(blocks read 
or written) 
A;  
Execute 
Abort the write or read that 
involves too many bytes, 
thwarting novel attacks that 
cause infinite read or write loop 
Content 
control 
I;  Inspect  Block requests that include 
executables and scripts 
Renaming  I; Inspect  Block requests that try 
 
The  2
nd  column  describes the  nature  of  the  mediation, i.e., the 
security attribute (C for Confidentiality, I for Integrity and A for 
Availability)  that  would  suffer  without  the  policy  along  with 
whether  the  policy  is  based  on  Inspection,  Execution  and 
Transformation. The 3
rd column describes the control actions. 
The policy and control imposed by the network crumple zone are 
similarly described by the following table: 
 
Policy item  Type  Control Action and notes  
Fingerprinting  C; 
 Inspect    
Drop or  “wash” response, 
thwarts application and 
transport layer probing  
Argument 
filtering 
C, I and A; 
Inspect 
Block requests, stopping 
application level requests to 
change directory, exec., 
malformed requests, arguments 
Rate 
enforcement 
A, Inspect 
and Execute 
Block requests,  based on 
source based and aggregate 
number of packets and requests 
Protocol 
transform 
C, A and I; 
Transform 
Normalize requests into a well 
tested library, thwarting novel 
attacks that exploit browser and 
vendor specific extensions 
Try before 
you accept 
C, A and I; 
Execute and 
Inspect 
Block requests, thwarts novel 
attacks that inject  undesired 
and out of range application  
behavior 
 
The policies enforced at the crumple zones are usually a mix of 
generic and application specific policies. The generic policies are 
applicable  to  a  class  of  applications  (e.g.,  all  web  service 
applications) and can take application specific parameters. Rate 
and  size  checking,  validation  and  sanitization  of  inputs  are 
examples.  Application  specific policies  are  can  be  provided  by 
various  stakeholders  such  as  the  application  developer  or  the 
application deployer or the user; and can also be determined by 
human experts by empirical observation.  A specific installation of 
the  web  service-based  document  management  application 
described in this section may have the T policy to transform all 
word  documents  into  pdfs,  and  disallow  opening  of  outbound 
socket connections. The E policy of try-before-accept is a curious 
mix  of  generic  and  specific:  the  generic  aspect  is  that  for  any 
protected application, one needs an application proxy or code that 
partially emulates the application in one of the crumple zones. At 
the  same  time,  the  proxy,  by  nature is application specific, for 
example, in our illustrative application it is essentially a replica of 
the application running in the network crumple zone. It is also 
worth  noting  that  E  policy  is  usually  complemented  by  its 
accompanying  I  policies  that  monitor  the  execution  of  the  E 
policy (i.e., watches over the proxy). Some of these I policies can 
be highly generic—such as death the proxy or code performing 
the execution/processing of channel events, while the others can 
be  application  specific  such  as,  watching  for  the  frequency  of  
specific  files  being  down  loaded  or  the  frequency  of  delete 
operations performed by a individual users. 
3.  EVALUATION TO DATE  
We  used  a  Dell  Latitude  D820  laptop,  an  Intel  Centrino  Duo 
clocked at 2.33Ghz and 2GB of memory connected to a single 
router  along  with  a  client  PC  as  our  experimental  set  up.  The 
D820  is  used  to  host  an  illustrative  web  service  application 
protected by A3 with the APPVM and network and storage VMs 
as shown in Figure 3, the client laptop is used for sending both 
benevolent  and  attack  HTTP  requests  to  the  protected  web-
service. We use Xen 3.1.4 with Fedora Core 8 (kernel 2.6.18.8) 
images  for  both  Dom0  and  three  DomUs  in  the  prototype  A3 
environment.  Each  DomU  is  configured  to  have  one  CPU  and 
512MB of memory. 
For  the  initial  assessment  of  the  overhead  associated  with  A3 
crumple zones, we recorded six unique client interactions with a 
web-service over a 10 minute window and used the recordings to 
drive our protected web service. Each client represents a different 
client OS, web-browser and usage-pattern. The usage pattern is 
roughly  categorized  as:  (i)  a  batch-bulk  download  every  2 
minutes,  (ii)  a  file  download  every  minute,  (iii)  random  heavy 
burst of  eight mixed operations lasting between 10 to 20 seconds, 
(iv) a upload-download-delete cycle (.2Hz), (v) a constant fast-
clicking refresher (.3Hz), and (vi) a heavy uploader every minute. 
Clients submit and retrieve files ranging from 9KB to 476KB and 
of multiple mime-types. Taken as a whole, the clients driving the 
protected web service present a load equivalent of a small-office 
wiki. The results of the performance assessment experiments are 
described in Section 3.1 
Objective evaluation of how effective a defense mechanism is has 
always  been  a  challenge,  and  our  experience  in  evaluating  the 
effectiveness of A3 is no exception. The most credible validation 
by the community is independent red team experiments, which we 
expect  to  undertake  later  in  the  project,  however,  red  team 
evaluation  has  its  own  limitations  such  as  the  motivation, 
expertise  and  resources  of  the  red  team  and  the  rules  of 
engagement  used  in  the  experiments.  Clearly,  the  answer  to 
questions like has A3 made the illustrative application completely 
invincible to attacks is no. In fact, A3 alone cannot achieve that 
goal.  However,  the  crumple  zones  do  make  attacks  on  the 
application  that  make  use  or  exploit  the  storage  and  network 
channels more difficult to actually affect the application. In the 
preliminary evaluation we sought to validate that claim by taking 
the following approach. First, starting with the semantics of the 
web service application, we developed a number of I/E/T policies 
that we deployed in the network and storage CZ, and subjected both the protected and unprotected application to requests with 
appropriate privilege that attempt to break the application or cause 
undesired behavior or effect in the system. Second, we conducted 
tests where we injected failures into the crumple zones, emulating 
the  effects  of  novel  attacks  to  observe  how  the  protected 
application behaves. Section 3.2 elaborates.  
3.1  Efficiency 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the client latencies of the unprotected 
baseline application and the A3 protected application respectively. 
The  protected  application  uses  the  default  un-optimized  A3 
policies (all policies and virtual disk committed after every update 
event). Round-trip latencies are collected from clients replaying 
the  six  profiles  and  are  grouped  into  three  categories:  list  and 
delete; download and upload. This grouping separates data-heavy 
ingress  and  egress  flow  (upload/download)  from  light-weight 
requests (list files, get upload form and delete a file).  
The average latency aggregating the different categories is 50.2ms 
for the baseline, compared to 64.9ms with A3 protection. In other 
words,  the  default  non-optimized  A3  CZs  introduce  a  29% 
overhead under this specific load. This overhead may seem low 
considering that the proxy crumple zone is fully executing and 
reverse proxying the request to the real application, but we note 
that  the  network  latency  may  mask  some  of  the  overhead 
introduced by A3. 
We  examine  Figure  5  to  identify  which  component  of  A3 
contributes most to A3’s overhead, and observe an outlier group 
of list-delete operations and a few spurious download and upload 
operations.  Over  both  runs,  list-delete,  download  and  upload 
make 80%, 12% and 8% of the total requests respectively. While 
the  average  baseline  list-delete  latencies  are  16.4ms (compared 
with 64.6ms for A3), over 11% of the A3 list-delete outliers have 
latencies greater than 100ms.  
In the current prototype, the storage channel commits the virtual 
disk of the Network CZ host running the application proxy by 
rsyncing  the  application  proxy’s  stored-filed  directory  to 
persistent storage (the rsync duration for this fixed traffic volume 
is a consistent 250ms) after a configurable number of operations 
which  modify  the  application  state,  here,  upload  and  delete 
operations. At the beginning of the commit sequence, a firewall 
rule is introduced to block incoming client requests and ultimately 
wait  to  reach  request-quiescence  before  starting  the  rsync.  To 
evaluate  A3’s  sensitivity  to  commit  intervals,  we  ran  four 
experiments varying the commit interval between one and fifteen 
as shown in the box-plots in Figure 6. The box-plots show the 
distribution  of  client  latencies,  the  mean  latency  (large  X  per 
series) and a trail of outliers for each evaluation.  
From the analysis, we notice average latencies decrease (64.6ms, 
60.7ms,  55.2ms  49.6ms)  as  the  check  pointing  interval  grows. 
Likewise,  the  severity  of  the  outliers  decrease  as  the  commit 
interval  grows.  We  believe  that  both  of  these  trends,  when 
considered  against  the  relative  high  volume  (i.e.,  80%  of  all 
requests)  of  list-delete  operations,  explain  why  list-delete 
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Figure 6: Impact of Commit Interval operations fair so poorly for our A3 application. In effect, list-
delete operations are more likely to be blocked when a commit 
occurs, thus resulting in a higher perceived latency. 
 
3.2  Effectiveness 
Using a commit interval of 15 modification events and the client 
mix  as  described  earlier,  we  introduced  six  random  attacking 
clients to exercise A3 CZ defenses and record client overheads 
under attack scenarios. During a ten minute experiment, we used 
six  attack  clients  attempting  a  variety  of  attacks:  (i)  script 
injection  to  compromise  future  legitimate  requests,  (ii)  path 
traversal to exfiltrate and infiltrate data, (iii) random fuzzing to 
scan  for  buffer  overruns  and  host  fingerprinting,  (iv)  resource 
exhaustion,  (v) upload and execution of binary files and (vi) a 
fault-injection  client  that  triggers  a  synthetic  crash  in  the 
application  proxy  running  the  network  CZ  during  the  sixth 
minute. Against our naive web-service without A3’s protections 
the  same  attacks  result  in  cross-site  script  attacks,  removal  of 
readable  host  configuration  files  (e.g.,  private  encryption  keys, 
/etc/iptables),  replacement  of  writable  files,  fingerprinting  via 
thrown exceptions, resource starvation, and execution of arbitrary 
shell code and attack binaries. We also verified that the failure 
injected at the application proxy will also kill the application if 
injected at the application itself. Figure 7 captures the results. 
 
The top half of Figure 7 shows a time-series showing the latencies 
for  the  six  benevolent  clients,  commit  durations,  and the crash 
roll-back  recovery  duration  from  the  fault-injection.  As  can  be 
seen in the figure, other than the interval around the 6
th minute, 
the benevolent clients did not suffer any loss of service. In the 
bottom half of the figure, we group and plot each policy violation 
in time as reported from the A3 host. Speaking generally, the A3 
host blocked binary file uploads and path traversal attempts in the 
storage  crumple-zone,  and  via  the  network  crumple  zone,  A3 
enforced a strict QoS policy on request rate thus mitigating DoS 
attempts,  filtered  <script>  tags  from  submission  thus  blocking 
script injection attempts and enforced WS parameter and HTTP 
header constraints thus disallowing the execution of arbitrary, out-
of-bounds fuzzed inputs. Specifically, the attack clients attempted 
1,519  attacks  and  benevolent  clients  executed  933  requests, 
which,  in  effect,  doubled  the  number  of  clients.  In  terms  of 
average  latency  for  the  benevolent  clients,  the  additional  load 
introduced  by  the  experiment  (i.e.,  request  load  and  A3  I/E/T 
policies) resulted in a modest 4% of additional overhead. In terms 
of  distribution  of  performance, we observed a max latency 1% 
larger  than  the  previous  15-interval  experiment  which  is 
ultimately negligible. 
The  final  thing  to  notice  in  Figure  is  the  grayed-out  recovery 
window. As mentioned earlier, during the sixth minute of the run, 
we injected a synthetic crash failure emulating a novel attack that 
would not have been blocked by policy violation in the earlier 
stages. However, this attack was fully absorbed by the network 
crumple  zone’s  proxy.  Unoptimized,  A3  can  detect  a  process 
crash (observers for more complex failures such as verifying the 
integrity of the CZ VMs are under development) in the network 
crumple  zone,  and  complete  the  subsequent  roll-back  recovery 
comprising of tearing down the crumple zone VMs, and restoring 
them to the last known good checkpoint in under 77 seconds. 
4.  CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS  
The  initial  evaluation  of  the  A3  execution  container  and 
constituent prevention-focused mediation and adaptive response 
indicates  that  the  middleware-based,  near-application  and 
application-specific cyber-defense can be effective against novel 
attacks whose signatures are not known, and such defenses can be 
mounted effectively. 
We are continuing to enhance the CZ policies. A specific case 
alluded  to  in  the  previous  section  concerns  enhancement  of  I 
policies.  This  involves  developing  observers  for  more 
 
Figure 7: A3-protected Application under Attack sophisticated  compromised  behavior and undesirable conditions 
than process crash. We are using Virtual Machine Introspection 
(VMI)  and  application-specific  invariants  to  implement  these 
observers.  Work is also underway to support recovery-focused 
adaptation  using  ASM  and improving the defensive policy and 
configuration using RwM. 
Evaluation of a security solution such as A3 that aims to address 
the  uncertainty  and  impact  of  novel  attacks is  a hard problem. 
Testing  the  technology  against  an  application  with  known 
vulnerabilities goes part way in demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the  technology,  but  falls  short  on  evaluating  the  technology’s 
response to novel attack. We are extending the failure injection 
approach  described in Section 3.2 to emulate the manifestation of 
novel attacks by using a protected application that is injected with 
artificial  vulnerabilities  (i.e.,  made  artificially  vulnerable)  and 
exploiting  the  vulnerabilities  in  a  non-deterministic  way.  Our 
future evaluation plan includes testing whether the I/E/T policies 
of A3 crumple zones can absorb and contain such attack effects, 
and if not, whether advanced state management and replay with 
modification can quickly recover and reconstitute a more effective 
defense.  
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